Unnaschied vunde Gschischde vun "Beharren auf Überzeugungen"

|Text=The preliminary observations reported heresuggest that the importance of conceptual con-servatism has been underestimated in the psychological literature and that the insistence thatthe phenomenon constitutes one of the majorimpediments to progress in the history of ideascould very well be correct. In particular, although conceptual conservatism has received theattention of experimentalists, although its importance in human affairs has been long recognized and although the results reported here are based on a small sample, the qualitative outcome of this study — all subjects clung in practice to an observationally absurd formula and none rejected it outright even on the verbal level — are surprising. Even when we deal with ideologically neutral conceptions of reality, when these conceptions have been recently acquired, when they came to us from unfamiliar sources, when they were assimilated for spurious reasons, when their abandonment entails little tangible risks or costs, and when they are sharply contradicted by subsequent events, we are, at least for a time, disinclined to doubt such conceptionson the verbal level and unlikely to let go of them in practice.

|ref=<ref name="Nissani" />}}

 

== Vawais ==